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Abstract
In this note we study the greedy algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular
bidders. It is well known that this algorithm provides an approximation ratio of 2 for every
order of the items. We show that if the valuations are vertex cover functions and the order is
random then the expected approximation ratio imrpoves to 7
4
.
1 Introduction
In a combinatorial auction there is a setM items (|M | = m) for sale. There is also a set of N bidders
(|N | = n). Each bidder i has a valuation function vi : 2
M → R that denotes the value of bidder i
for every possible subset of the items. We assume that the valuation functions are monotone (for
all S ⊆ T , vi(S) ≥ vi(T )) and normalized (vi(∅) = 0). For an item j and a bundle S, we use the
notation v(j|S) to denote the marginal value of item j given a bundle S: v({j} + S)− v(S). The
goal is to find an allocation of the items that maximizes the welfare Σivi(Si). We assume that
access to the valuation function is done via value queries: for a bundle S, what is v(S)? Our goal
is to (approximately) maximize the welfare using only poly(m,n) value queries.
In this note we consider the case where the valuations of the bidders are submodular. A valuation
v is submodular if v(j|S) ≥ v(j|T ) for every S ⊆ T . The problem of combinatorial auctions with
submodular valuations was first introduced by Lehmann, Lehmann, and Nisan [11] who showed
that the following simple greedy algorithm provides an approximation ratio of 2: go over all items
one by one at some arbitrary order, allocate each item to the bidder that maximizes the expected
marginal value of the item given the set of items that he won so far.
Follwing [11], the problem was extensively studied in the literature and is now well understood:
there exists an e
e−1 approximation algorithm that makes polynomiallly many queries [13] and this
is the best possible [12, 9].
Here we return to the classic greedy algorithm of [11] and ask whether the expected approxima-
tion ratio improves when we use a random ordering of the items instead of an arbitrary one. While
we do not know if this is the case in general, we are able to answer this question for a special case:
Theorem: If all valuations are vertex cover valuations then the random greedy algorithm provides
an approximation ratio of 74 .
Vertex cover functions are defined as follows: let G = (V,E) be a graph with |V | = m. We associate
the set of vertices V with the set of items M in the combinatorial auction. We let v(S) be the
number of edges that have at least one end point in S. It is easy to see that every vertex cover
1
function is also submodular (and in fact is also a coverage valuation)1.
We also show that the random greedy algorithm does not provide an approximation ratio better
than 240177 ≈ 1.356 on vertex cover functions. Note that the problem is APX-hard [7].
There are several advantages to our approach. First, there is the obvious advantage of showing
that simple and practical algorithms provide a good approximation ratio. Furthermore, even though
there exists a polynomial time algorithm that obtains an approximation ratio of e
e−1 [13], our work
contibutes to the growing body of literature attempting to obtain faster algorithms for problems
in submodular optimization with comparable approximation guarantees (see, e.g., [1, 4, 2]).
In addition, the greedy algorithm is in a sense an online algorithm: items arrive one by one and
we have to allocate the items immediately. In this model it is known that the greedy algorithm is
essentially optimal [10] (although an algorithm with a slightly better approximation ratio of 2− 1
n
exists [8]). Hence it is natural to explore hybrid models, for example, in the spirit of the famous
secretary problem, when the set of items is determined adversarially but their order is random.
A final advantage of the random greedy algorithm that we would like to discuss here is an
application to auction design. Christodoulou et al [5] study simultaneous second price auctions:
each bidder submits a bid for every item, he wins the set of items for which his bid was maximal, and
pays the sum of the second-highest bids of every item he won. They show that subject to a certain
no-overbidding condition every Nash equilibrium provides a 2 approximation to the optimal welfare.
Furthermore, the greedy algorithm can be easily adapted to produce a Nash equilibrium with that
approximation ratio. It is not known how to compute a Nash equilibrium with an approximation
ratio better than 2 with only polynomially many value queries (although this is possible for several
special cases, see [6]), and our work suggests the analysis of the ranodm greedy algorithm as a
possible attack in this direction.
We leave open the question of determining the approximation ratio of the random greedy
algorithm for combinatorial auctions with general submodular bidders. A very interesting open
question is to understand whether the random greedy algorithm can obtain an approximation
ratio better than e
e−1 for interesting special cases, such as combinatorial auctions with budget
additive valuations. The current best known algorithm guarantees an approximation ratio of 43 via
a complicated iterative rounding scheme [3]. Can a mathcing or even better ratio be obtained by
the random greedy algorithm?
2 Preliminaries
We consider the following Random Greedy algorithm:
ROG (v1...vn,M)
1. Choose uniformly at random a permutation σ on the order of the items.
2. Let S01 = ... = S
0
n = ∅.
3. For t = 1..m:
(a) Denote by j = σ(t) the t’th item in the permutation.
(b) Let i be a player whose marginal value of j is maximal. I.e., i ∈ argmaxi vi (j|Si).
1The name monotone cut functions is also sometimes associated with these functions for the following reason:
consider two bidders with vertex cover valuations that are defined on the same graph G. Consider any allocation of
all items (S,M − S). The value of this allocation is the number of vertices plus twice the number of edges in the cut
defined by S.
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(c) For every i′ 6= i Sti′ = S
t−1
i′ . Set S
t
i = S
t−1
i ∪ {j}.
4. Return Sm1 ...S
m
n .
We analyze the approximation ratio of the algorithm in the case where all functions are vertex
cover functions:
Definition 2.1 (vertex cover functions) We say that v is a vertex cover function if there exists
an undirected graph G = (V,E) such that for every S ⊆ V we have that v (S) = | {e = (i, j) |i ∈ S or j ∈ S} |.
From now on we assume that all the vi’s are vertex cover functions. I.e., there are graphs
G1...Gn such that for every i, vi is the vertex cover function of Gi.
3 The Approximation Ratio of the Random Greedy Algorithm
3.1 A Lower Bound
We start the analyis of the approximation ratio of the random greedy algorithm with a lower bound.
Claim 3.1 There is an instance for which E[ROG(v1...vn,M)]
OPT
≤ 177240 + o (1).
Proof: We produce an instance with three players and m is odd. Gi = (V,Ei).
• G1 is a star graph: E1 = {(1,m) , (2,m) ... (m− 1,m)}.
• G2 is a line graph: E2 = {(1, 2) , (3, 4) ... (m− 2,m− 1)}.
• G2 is also a line graph: E3 = {(2, 3) , (4, 5) ... (m− 3,m− 2)}.
In case of ties, we prefer to give items to player 1, rather than to player 2, rather than to player 3.
The optimal allocation is OPT1 = {m}, OPT2 = {1, 3, ...m − 2} and OPT3 = {2, 4, ...m − 1}.
(OPT1, OPT2, OPT3) uses all the edges, so it has to be the optimal solution. The value of the
optimal allocation is 2m− 1.
Claim 3.2 E[v1 (S
m
1 )] = m− 1.
Proof: Player 1 always takes item m, and then his value is v1 (S
m
i ) ≥ v1 (m) = m − 1. On the
other hand v1 (M) = m− 1, so v1 (S
m
1 ) = m− 1 always.
Claim 3.3 E[v2 (S
m
2 )] =
m−1
3 .
Proof: For i = 1...m−12 , let Ai be an indicator random variable, that indicates whether we
assigned items 2i − 1, or 2i to player 2. Note that v2 (S
m
2 ) =
∑m−1
2
i=1 Ai. If m appeared after both
2i−1 and 2i, the algorithm assigned 2i−1, 2i and m to player 1. Otherwise, the algorithm assigned
either 2i− 1 or 2i to player 2. Therefore, Pr[Ai = 1] =
2
3 , and we have
E[v2 (S
m
2 )] =
m−1
2∑
i=1
E[Ai] =
m− 1
3
3
Claim 3.4 E[v3 (S
m
3 )] =
17(m−3)
120 .
Proof: For i = 1...m−32 let Ai be an indicator random variable that indicates whether we assigned
item 2i or 2i+1 to player 3. I.e Ai indicates if we used the edge (2i, 2i + 1) in the graph G3. Note
that v3 (S
m
3 ) =
∑m−1
2
i=1 Ai.
Consider the item 2i and denote t = σ−1 (j). v1 (2i) = v2 (2i) = v3 (2i) = 1. The algorithm
assigns item 2i to player only if v1
(
2i|Sti
)
= v2
(
2i|Sti
)
= 0 and v3
(
2i|Sti
)
= 1. If v2
(
2i|Sti
)
= 0
then it means that
1. 2i− 1 appears before 2i in the permutation σ, because the algorithm used edge (2i− 1, 2i).
2. m appears before 2i− 1, because otherwise we would have given item 2i− 1 to player 1.
Therefore, the order of items 2i− 1, 2i and m must be (m, 2i − 1, 2i). Similarly, the order of items
2i+ 1, 2i+ 2 and m must be (m, 2i+ 2, 2i + 1).
Let Bi be the event that the order of items 2i − 1, 2i,m is (m, 2i− 1, 2i). Let Ci be the event
that the order of items 2i+ 1, 2i + 2,m is (m, 2i+ 2, 2i + 1).
Pr[Ai] = Pr[Bi = 1 or Ci = 1] = Pr[Bi] + Pr[Ci]− Pr[Bi = 1 and Ci = 1]
Note that Bi = 1 and Ci = 1 if and only if all 3 conditions are true:
1. m is the first item among (m, 2i − 1, 2i, 2i + 1, 2i + 2). This happens with probability 15 .
2. 2i− 1 appears before item 2i. This happens with probability 12 .
3. 2i+ 2 appears before item 2i+ 1. This happens with probability 12 .
Note that these conditions are independent so Pr[Bi = 1 and Ci = 1] =
1
20 .
Overall, we have Pr[Ai] = Pr[Bi] + Pr[Ci]− Pr[Bi = 1 and Ci = 1] =
1
6 +
1
6 −
1
20 =
17
60 . Since
there are m−32 different Ai, then E[v3 (S
m
3 )] =
17(m−3)
120 .
Back to the proof of claim 3.1:
E[(ROG)] = E[v1 (S
m
1 )] + E[v2 (S
m
2 )] +E[v3 (S
m
3 )] = (m− 1)
(
1 +
1
3
+
17
120
+O (1)
)
Therefore, E[(ROG)]
OPT
= 177240 + o (1).
3.2 The Upper Bound: A Warm Up
As a warm up, we first show that when all valuations are vertex cover functions then the random
greedy algorithm provides an approximation ratio of 2. Of course, in [11] it was shown that every
ordering provides this approximation ratio, but the proof we give provides an illustration of the
properties of vertex cover functions that we use in our main result.
Theorem 3.5 Let v1...vn be n vertex cover functions. E[ROG (v1...vn,M)] ≥
1
2
∑
vi (OPTi).
Proof: Consider a certain item j, for which i = O (j). Vertex j has vi (j) neighbours in the
grapsh Gi. Let B (j) be a random variable representing the number of j’s neighbours that appeared
in the random order before j. B (j) distributes uniformly between [0..vi (j)]. Therefore,
E[B (j)] =
1
2
vi (j) (1)
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Note that in vertex cover functions, the marginal value of a vertex is the total number of neighbours
it has, that has not yet taken by the algorithm. Therefore (we use the standard notation δG (v) for
the set of neighbours of v in a graph G),
vi (j|Si) = vi (j)− |Si ∩ δGi (j) | (2)
Since Si ∩ δGi (j) contains only vertices that appear before j, we have that |Si ∩ δGi (j) | ≤ B (j).
Therefore, by (1) and (2) : E[vi (j|Si)] ≥
1
2vi (j). The algorithm chooses at every step the
player that maximizes vi′ (j|Si′). Therefore, E[maxi′∈N v
′
i (j|Si′)] ≥ E[vi (j|Si)] ≥
1
2vi (j). By
summing over all items we get that the value of the allocation that the algorithm returns is at least
1
2ΣjvO(j) (j), which is at least half of the value of the optimal solution.
In the next subsection we will show that the random greedy algorithm indeed provides an
approximation ratio better than 2. The improved analysis takes advantage on some slackness in
the proof above. For example, if the approximation ratio is no better than 2, then the proof above
implies that for every vertex j, |Si∩ δGi (j) | = B (j), i.e., the algorithm used all the edges of vertex
j in GO(j) that appeared before it in the random order. However, if that is the case, then we should
count the contribution of these edges in the value of the solution that the algorithm outputs. In a
similar manner, if the approximation ratio is no better than 2, the analysis implies that the value
that the algorithm gained from item j is close to vO (j)
(
j|SO(j)
)
. Therefore, for every item j, there
is another player, i′ for whom the marginal value of item j is close to the marginal value of player
O (j). Again, we can use the other player to claim that the expected value of the solution is higher.
3.3 The Main Result
For the analysis we fix an optimal allocation (OPT1, ..., OPTn) and let OPT =
∑
vi (OPTi).
Theorem 3.6 Let v1...vn be n vertex cover functions. E[ROG (v1...vn,M)] ≥
4
7
∑
vi (OPTi).
Proof: In the proof we use the notation O (j) to denote the player that gets item j in the optimal
allocation (i.e., j ∈ OPTi) and A (j) to denote the player who gets item j in the algorithm. Notice
that A (j) is a random variable.
Denote by OPT t the marginal value of the optimal allocation, given that the algorithm al-
ready allocated items σ (1) ...σ (t− 1). OPT t =
∑
vi
(
OPTi ∩ {σ(t), . . . ...σ(m)}|S
t
i
)
. Notice that
OPT 0 = OPT and OPTm = 0.
We say that an edge e = (j1, j2) ∈ Gi has been taken by the algorithm at step t, if j1 = σ (t),
A (j1) = i, and j2 /∈ S
t−1
i . I.e., the algorithm gave player i one vertex adjacent to the edge, while
the other vertex has not yet been given to player i.
For every item j, let C (j) = argmaxi 6=O(j) vi (j). I.e., C (j) is the largest competitor to take
the item from O (j). In the following we denote by bC (j) the number of edges adjacent to j in the
graph GC(j) that were used by the algorithm before item j. I.e., bC (j) = vC(j) (j)−vC(j)
(
j|St−1
C(j)
)
.
Similarly, denote by bO (j) the number of edges, adjacent to j in the graph GO(j), used by the
algorithm before item j. We use a counting argument to bound the quality of the solution that the
algorithm outputs:
Claim 3.7 ROG (v1...vn,M) ≥
∑M
j=1 (bC (j) + bO (j)).
Proof for this claim will be provided later. Note that
∑
bO (j) =
∑
vO(j) (j)−
∑
vO(j)
(
j|St−1
O(j)
)
. By
submodularity,
∑
vO(j) (j) ≥ OPT . The algorithm at each step chooses the item that maximizes
5
the marginal utility. Denote by ROGt the value of all the players at iteration t: ROGt =
∑
vi
(
Sti
)
.
Therefore, ROGt −ROGt−1 ≥ vO(j)
(
j|St−1
O(j)
)
. Therefore,
∑
bO (j) ≥ OPT −ROG (v1...vn,M)
Combined with claim 3.7, we get that:
Corollary 3.8 bC (j) ≤ 2ROG (v1...vn,M)−OPT
Let ROG (j) be a random variable representing value the algorithm gains from item j. I.e., for
j = σ (t), then ROG (j) = ROGt − ROGt−1. We present an argument in which a competitor for
item j with higher value increases the expectancy of the value of the algorithm from item j.
Claim 3.9 • If vO(j) (j) ≥ vC(j) (j), then
E (ROG (j)) ≥
(
vO(j) (j)
2
+
vC(j) (j)
2 + vC(j) (j)
2
(
vO(j) + 1
) − bC (j)
)
• If vC(j) (j) ≥ vO(j) (j), then
E (ROG (j)) ≥ vC(j) (j)− bC (j)
The proof for this claim will also be provided later.
In contrast to claim 3.9 we claim that if vC(j) (j) is small, then roughly speaking, the algorithm
almost always gives item j to O (j). That is because if item j appears in the beginning of the
random order, then the marginal value of j to player O (j) is bigger than vC(j) (j).
for an item j = σ (t), let LOSS (j) be the decrease in the value of the optimal, given that we
gave item j to A (j): LOSS (j) = OPT t−1 −OPT t.
Claim 3.10 If vO(j) (j) ≥ vC(j) (j), then
E[ROG (j)] ≥ E[LOSS (j)]−
vC(j) (j)
2 + vC(j) (j)
vO(j)(j) + 1
If vC(j) (j) ≥ vO(j) (j), then
E[ROG (j)] ≤ E[LOSS (j)]− vO(j) (j)
.
The proof for this claim will also be provided later. First, we show how to derive theorem 3.6
using claims 3.7, 3.9 and 3.10.
We split our analysis to two sets of items. M1 is the set of items for which vO(j) (j) ≥ vC(j) (j).
M2 is the rest of the items. By claim 3.9 on items in M1 we have,
2E[
∑
j∈M1
ROG (j)] ≥ 2
∑
j∈M1
(
vO(j) (j)
2
+
vC(j) (j)
2 + vC(j) (j)
2
(
vO(j) (j) + 1
) − bC (j)
)
By claim 3.10 we have,
E[
∑
j∈M1
ROG (j)] ≥ E[
∑
j∈M1
LOSS (j)]−
vC(j) (j)
2 + vC(j) (j)(
vO(j) + 1
)
6
Summing these equation and rearranging:
E[
∑
j∈M1
ROG (j)] ≥
1
3
E[
∑
j∈M1
(
vO(j) (j) + LOSS (j) − 2bC (j)
)
] (3)
Our next goal is to give a similar bound for items in M2. We apply claim 3.9 on all items in
M2. Note that this time we use the second part of the claim:
2
3
E[
∑
j∈M2
ROG (j)] ≥
2
3
E

∑
j∈M2
vC(j) (j) − bC (j)

 (4)
Using claim 3.10 we have:
1
3
E[
∑
j∈M2
ROG (j)] ≥
1
3
E

∑
j∈M2
E[LOSS (j)]− vO(j) (j)

 (5)
Summing (4) and (5), we have
E[
∑
j∈M2
ROG (j)] ≥
1
3
E

∑
j∈M2
E[LOSS (j)]− vO(j) (j) + 2vC(j) (j)− 2bC (j)


Since we are looking at j ∈M2, vC(j) (j) ≥ vO(j) (j). Therefore,
E[
∑
j∈M2
ROG (j)] ≥
1
3
E[
∑
j∈M2
(
vO(j) (j) + LOSS (j) − 2bC (j)
)
] (6)
Combining (3) and (6):
E[
∑
j∈M
ROG (j)] ≥
1
3
E

∑
j∈M
vO(j) (j) + E[LOSS (j)]− 2bC (j)


Since
∑
vO(j) ≥ OPT ,
∑
(LOSS (j)) = OPT , and by corollary 3.8, We have
E[
∑
j∈M
ROG (j)] ≥
1
3
(OPT +OPT − 4ROG+ 2OPT )
It follows that E[
∑
j∈M ROG (j)] ≥
4
7OPT .
Proof of claim 3.7
We will show that ROG (v1...vn,M) ≥
∑M
j=1 (bC (j) + bO (j)), by proving that
∑M
j=1 (bC (j) + bO (j))
counts partial set of all the edges taken by the algorithm.
We denote each edge taken by the algorithm by (j1, j2, i), where (j1, j2) ∈ Gi. Consider an
item j such that j = σ (t). Let BO (j) the set of edges adjacent to j in the graph GC(j), used by
the algorithm before item j. I.e., BO (j) =
{
(j1, j, i) |i = O (j) ∧ j1 ∈ S
t′
i ∧ (t
′ < t)
}
, and bO (j) =
|BO (j) |. Similarly, Let BC (j) =
{
(j1, j, i) |i = C (j) ∧ j1 ∈ S
t′
i ∧ (t
′ < t)
}
and bC (j) = |Bc (j) |.
Notice that for every j, BC (j) and BO (j), have only edges taken by the algorithm. Moreover,
all the sets BC (1) ...BC (m) , BO (1) ...BO (m) are disjoint. Therefore,
∑M
j=1 (bC (j) + bO (j)) counts
only edges used by the algorithm, and counts every edge at most once. The claim follows.
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Proof of claim 3.9
We start with the following claim:
Claim 3.11 Let X be a uniformly distributed random variable between [0...x] and let y be a con-
stant. If x ≥ y then E[max (X, y)] ≥ x2 +
y2+y
2(x+1) . If y ≥ x then E[max (X, y)] = y
Proof: Computing directly the expectation, we get
E[max (X, y)] =
y∑
i=0
y
x+ 1
+
x∑
i=y+1
i
x+ 1
=
(y + 1) y
x+ 1
+
(x− y) (x+ y + 1)
2 (x+ 1)
=
x
2
+
y2 + y
2 (x+ 1)
On the other hand, if y ≥ x, then max (X, y) = y always.
To prove claim 3.9 we need to show:
• If vO(j) (j) ≥ vC(j) (j), then
E (ROG (j)) ≥
(
vO(j) (j)
2
+
vC(j) (j)
2 + vC(j) (j)
2
(
vO(j) + 1
) − bC (j)
)
• If vC(j) (j) ≥ vO(j) (j), then
E (ROG (j)) ≥ vC(j) (j)− bC (j)
Suppose that item j = σ (t). The algorithm can choose to give the item to either O (j) or to C (j).
ROG (j) ≥ max
{
vO(j)
(
j|St−1
O(j)
)
, vC(j)
(
j|St−1
C(j)
)}
= max
{
vO(j) (j)− bO (j) , vC(j) (j)− bC (j)
}
≥ max
{
vO(j) (j)− bO (j) , vC(j) (j)
}
− bC (j)
We repeat an argument we used in claim 3.5: bO (j) can count only edges that appear before j in the
permutation σ. vO(j) (j)−b (j) ≥ |{σ(t+1), σ(m)}∩δGO(j) |. Set X = |{σ(t+1), . . . , σ(m)}∩δGO(j) |.
We have:
ROG (j) ≥ max
(
X, vC(j) (j)
)
− bC (j)
SinceX distributes uniformly between [0..vO(j) (j)], we can apply claim 3.11 to boundmax
(
X, vC(j) (j)
)
,
and claim 3.9 follows.
Proof of claim 3.10
We use a claim similar to the claim used for the proof that the greedy algorithm return a 12
approximation of the maximal welfare in [11].
Claim 3.12 Fix a permutation σ. Consider j = σ (t). If the algorithm assigned item j to O (j),
then LOSS (j) ≤ ROG (j). If the algorithm assigned item j to i 6= O (j) then LOSS (j) ≤
ROG (j) + vO(j)
(
j|St−1
O(j)
)
.
8
The proof for this claim appears in the appendix. Notice that this claim is true for any permutation
σ.
We will now derive claim 3.10. Recall that we want to show that:
• If vO(j) (j) ≥ vC(j) (j), then
E[ROG (j)] ≥ E[LOSS (j)]−
vC(j) (j)
2 + vC(j) (j)
vO(j) + 1
• If vC(j) (j) ≥ vO(j) (j), then
E[ROG (j)] ≤ E[LOSS (j)]− vO(j) (j)
We start with the case where vO(j) (j) ≥ vC(j) (j). If vO(j)
(
j|Sti
)
> vC(j) (j), the algorithm gives
item j to O (j). v
O(j|Sti)
= vO(j) − bO (j), and as we have seen before, bO (j) can be bounded by a
uniform variable.
Pr[vO(j)
(
j|Sti
)
> vC(j) (j)] = Pr[bO (j) <
(
vO(j) (j)− vC(j) (j)
)
]
≥
vO(j) (j)− vC(j) (j)
vO(j) (j) + 1
Therefore, the probability that the algorithm did not give item j to O (j) is at most
1+vC(j)(j)
vO(j)(j)+1
, and
in that case vO(j)
(
j|St−1
O(j)
)
≤ vC(j) (j). We use claim 3.12 to bound E[LOSS (j)]:
E[LOSS (j)] = E[LOSS (j) |j ∈ O (j)] · Pr[j ∈ O ()] + E[LOSS (j) |j /∈ O (j)] · Pr[j /∈ O (j)]
≤ E[ALG (j) · Pr[j ∈ O ()] +
(
E[ROG (j)] + vC(j) (j)
)
· Pr[j /∈ O (j)]
= E[ALG (j)] +
vC(j) (j) + vC(j) (j)
2
vO(j) (j) + 1
Suppose that vO(j) (j) ≤ vC(j) (j). By claim 3.11, LOSS (j) ≤ ROG (j)+vO(j)
(
j|St−1
O(j)
)
. Since
vO(j)
(
j|St−1
O(j)
)
≤ vO(j) (j), we have E[ROG (j)] ≤ E[LOSS (j)]− vO(j) (j).
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